Selected Labor & Employment Law
Updates
compiled by Book Review/Updates Editor
This section of the Journal provides notes on recent cases, pending or
newly enacted legislation, and other current legal materials. The Updates
section is designed to aid the practitioner in relating the Journal articles to
the daily practice of labor and employment law. The Journal welcomes
outside submissions of brief judicial and legislative summaries.
Supreme Court holds that NLRB's backpay award to unauthorized
alien violated immigration policies underlying IRCA. Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 00-1595, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 2147 (2002).
On March 27, 2002 in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed a
D.C. Circuit opinion upholding an award of backpay to an unauthorized
alien who provided false documentation to obtain employment.
The Court relied on the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA) and Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942). IRCA
prohibits the employment of undocumented aliens in the United States. It
is illegal for an undocumented alien to subvert IRCA by tendering
fraudulent documents. The Court reasoned that under Southern S.S. Co., it
is established that the NLRB may be required to yield where its chosen
remedies end in a result contrary to a federal statute or policy that is outside
of the purview of the Board. Thus, the Court held that "awarding backpay
to illegal aliens runs counter to policies underlying IRCA, policies that the
Board has not authority to enforce or administer."
Supreme Court holds that employers need not grant more than 12
weeks of FMLA leave in one year. Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc.
122 S. Ct 1155 (2002).
Under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) qualifying
employees are guaranteed twelve weeks of unpaid leave each year. The
Act encourages employers to adopt more generous policies. In keeping
with this, Wolverine granted Ragsdale thirty weeks of medical leave in
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1996. Wolverine refused Ragsdale's request for additional leave or
permission to work part-time and terminated her when she did not return to
work. Ragsdale's suit alleged that a Labor Department regulation required
Wolverine to grant her twelve additional weeks because she received no
notice from Wolverine that her thirty weeks of leave would count against
her FMLA entitlement. She was awarded summary judgment by the
District Court, which found that the regulation was in conflict with the
statute and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Labor Department
regulation (§ 825.700(a)) is contrary to the FMLA and further, was beyond
the Secretary of Labor's authority. Specifically, the Court held that the
Secretary's penalty for breach is contrary to the FMLA because it denies an
employer any credit for leave granted before notice was given to the
employee of their FMLA rights. The Court reasoned that this penalty is
unconnected to any prejudice that the employee might have suffered from
the employer's lapse since the employee will be entitled to twelve
additional weeks of leave even if the employee would have acted in the
same manner had notice been given.
Finally, the penalty amends the FMLA's fundamental guarantee of
entitlement to twelve weeks of leave in a twelve-month period, which is a
compromise between employers who wanted fewer weeks and employees
who wanted more.
Supreme Court holds that an employment discrimination complaint
need not contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case under the
McDonnell Douglasframework. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 122 S. Ct.
992 (2002).
Swierkiewicz sued his employer alleging that he was discharged in
violation of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The
District Court dismissed and the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that an
employment discrimination complaint must allege facts constituting a
prima facie case of discrimination as set forth under McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
The Court held that the McDonnell Douglas framework is an
evidentiary standard and not a pleading requirement. The court held that
under FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), a proper complaint must contain only a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that pleader is entitled to relief.
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Supreme Court holds that the Coal Act does not permit assignment of
retired miners to the successors in interest of out of business signatory
operators. Barnhartv. Sigmon Coal Co., 122 S. Ct. 941 (2002).
The Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 gives the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration the authority to assign
fiscal responsibility for a retired coal miner's health benefits to the most
appropriate coal mining company that employed the retired miner. If the
assigned coal miner is no longer in business responsibility may be assigned
to a related person or entity.
In this case the Commissioner assigned over eighty miners to the
Jericol Mining Company, because it was a successor in interest to an out of
business mining company that had employed the retired miners. The
District Court granted summary judgment and the Fourth Circuit affirmed,
concluding that Jericol was not a related entity under the statute.
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Coal
Act is explicit as to who may be assigned liability for beneficiaries and that
signatory operators are not identified anywhere in the statute as possible
assignees. The Court rejected arguments by the Commissioner that in light
of the statutory purpose of the Coal Act, signatory operators should be
included as assignees where there is no other related person or entity in
existence.
Supreme Court holds that an arbitrationagreement does not bar an
EEOC suitfor victim specific remedies. EEOC v. Waffle House, 122 S. Ct.
754 (2002).
Eric Baker was fired after suffering a seizure at work and being fired.
He filed an EEOC complaint alleging that Waffle House violated Title I of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The EEOC filed an
enforcement suit, independent of Baker. The EEOC alleged that the
employer's employment practices violated the ADA and sought injunctive
relief as well as backpay, reinstatement, and compensatory and punitive
damages for Baker.
The District Court denied Waffle House's petiton under the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) to stay the EEOC's suit and compel arbitration. The
Fourth Circuit held that the arbitration agreement did not preclude the
EEOC from bringing suit since the EEOC was not party to the agreement.
The Fourth Circuit did, however, limit the EEOC to injunctive relief.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the ADA
authorizes the EEOC to exercise the same enforcement powers, remedies,
and procedures that are set forth in Title VII. Under the 1991 Amendments
to Title VII, the EEOC has authority to bring suit to enjoin an employer
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from engaging in unlawful employment practices, and to seek
reinstatement, backpay, and compensatory or punitive damages in both
Title VII and ADA actions. No statutory or Supreme Court precedent
suggests that the existence of an arbitration agreement between private
parties materially alters the EEOC's statutory function or available
remedies.

